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Abstract
First, this paper empirically evaluates the incidence of the Japanese place-based job
creation program, which has rarely been studied in Japan. The program increases
employment, especially in the agricultural, retail trade, and service sectors, which
most treated municipalities promote. Second, this paper explores the municipalities
that the program affects most. Those with large aging populations and those with
small working age populations decrease the effects of the program. Third, this paper
assesses the externality effect of this program and does not observe a strong
reduction in sales, workers, or establishments in the neighboring municipalities of a
treated municipality.
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1 Introduction
Place-based policies are currently conducted in many countries such as European
countries, the USA, and Asian countries. This paper analyzes the job creation program
in Japan. This Japanese place-based job creation program is a bit unique. It is not a tax
credit, but a subsidy for the individual job creation plan designed by a municipality. A
detailed empirical evaluation of Japanese place-based policies for job creation has
rarely been conducted prior to this study, due to a lack of data.
Governments that hope to help residents in disadvantaged areas base their equity
criteria on differences in local labor market outcomes across cities and regions.
Neumark and Simpson (2015) argue that agglomeration economies, imperfect labor
mobility or spatial mismatches, and network effects justify place-based policies.
Most previous studies have emphasized assessing a subsidy’s impact on job creation,
and most academic research and official government documents have evaluated
how policies affect local employment, usually with the goal of computing the num-
ber of jobs created per dollar/yen spent. However, this emphasis has been
insufficient.
Kline and Moretti (2014a) argue that the job growth resulting from place-based pol-
icies induces migration into treated communities and increases living costs; thus, the
benefit from a subsidy turns to landowners under perfect mobility. Solely evaluating
the number of created jobs does not tell us whether a place-based policy improves
opportunities for employment, increases the income or welfare of disadvantaged
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residents, or benefits the landowners, migrants, and workers who commute to the
treated municipality. From this perspective, Busso et al. (2013) analyze the federal
urban empowerment zone program and find that the empowerment zone program
increases employment and wages without triggering corresponding increases in
population and local costs of living. Few theoretical and empirical papers examine
this issue. Therefore, this paper evaluates precisely the incidence of the place-based
job creation program in Japan, including residents’ mobility. This paper compares the
program’s effects on both resident workers and workers included commuting
workers, and it examines the change in the number of residents and households.
Moreover, this paper considers the efficient use of this program’s subsidy. Few papers
have empirically studied the efficiency of place-based policies, but it is important to
consider efficient use because the budgets of policy programs are always limited. Kline
and Moretti (2013), using a theoretical model, show that the targeting of less product-
ive areas implicit in place-based subsidies is efficient when hiring costs are excessive.
Briant et al. (2015) demonstrate that spatially integrated neighborhoods increase the
effect of the second wave of Zones Franches Urbaines (ZFU). Neumark and Grijalva
(2013) assess many hiring credits and clarify that credits that allow for the recapture
of payments if required goals are not met succeed in boosting employment.
This paper focuses on population size (size of the aging population, size of the work-
ing age population, and population density) among regional characteristics and explores
which municipalities are affected most by the program. The reason for this focus is that
the place-based job creation programs that this paper analyzes are conducted in rural
areas (as explained in detail later). These areas have an aging population problem. The
aging population problem is one of the political, economic, and social issues in Japan
and other countries, including China, India, and other developed countries, will face
this problem soon.
Although this program is efficient and used optimally, we must consider whether the
program is a zero-sum game. If consumption demand increases in the treated municipal-
ities because the program that this paper analyzes offers how-to seminars for local estab-
lishments to help them attract consumers to their local goods using local specialty
agricultural products in many cases, thus increasing the number of jobs created, but the
consumption demand decreases in neighboring municipalities, thus resulting in a de-
crease in the number of jobs, then the gain in the treated municipalities is canceled out by
the loss in the neighboring municipalities, and the total gain at the national level is zero.
Results in previous papers have been mixed. Bartik (1991) argues for a positive
effect. Both Freedman (2012), who estimates the effects of new market tax credits,
and Gobillon et al. (2012), who examines the French enterprise zone program that ex-
empts wage tax if firms hire more than 20% local labor, find a small spillover effect;
Neumark and Kolko (2010) and Ham et al. (2011) find no spillover effect; and Chirinko
and Wilson (2008), Wilson (2009), and Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) show a negative
effect on neighboring areas.
These mixed results could be attributed to reallocation in the case of negative effects
and positive externality effects in the case of positive effects and the fact that the litera-
ture examines different policy programs and uses different methods. Neumark and
Simpson (2015) note the distributional effect of place-based policies because skilled
workers are highly mobile and migrate to the treated cities, while low-income residents
Kazekami IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2017) 6:1 Page 2 of 27
who are targeted leave the treated areas in addition to the greatest impact to be on
businesses that are founded in enterprise zones or relocate into such zones. Hanson
and Rohlin (2013) argue that the effect of enterprise zone programs arises from reloca-
tion. Givord et al. (2013) find that the second wave of ZFU in 2004 boosted the number
of establishments in the treated areas by approximately 5–7% via births and relocations,
but the relative impact on relocation is much greater and produces negative spillovers
on nearby areas. Kline and Moretti (2014a) also discuss the related rationale of the ag-
glomeration economy. Social welfare could be increased if the gain were greater than
the corresponding loss. At a social optimum, the gains and the losses cancel each other
out exactly. Kline and Moretti (2014b) show serious flaws in the agglomeration ration-
ale for spatially progressive subsidies in US manufacturing. In addition to reallocation
issues, if place-based policies positively/negatively affect neighboring areas, the estima-
tion results based on comparisons between treatment groups and neighboring areas as
a control group have estimation bias.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the place-
based job creation programs that this paper evaluates. Section 3 presents the empirical
approach for examining the incidence of the programs and demonstrating the regional
features of efficient use. Section 3 explains the data, displays the fundamental evidence
using figures, and explains the estimation results. Section 4 analyzes the externality ef-
fect of the programs. Section 5 presents the robustness check of the program incidence
results from Section 3. Section 6 presents the conclusions.
2 The place-based job creation program
This place-based job creation program1 seeks to support the municipal job creation
policy in areas with few job opportunities. Local authorities design the job creation plan
and compete for money subsidized by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.
They are recommended to design the plan in relation to their municipal industry pro-
motion policy and related policies for local regeneration by other ministries.2
Local authorities can apply for this subsidy at the municipal level, but only munici-
palities that have levels of job vacancies per job seeker that are lower than the national
average can use this subsidy. Municipalities compete for money, but in reality, if the
job creation plan of an applying municipality does not meet a minimal criterion that
the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare determines and the applying municipality
cannot revise the plan to a suitable level, the applying municipality is rejected; few mu-
nicipalities, however, are rejected. This Japanese program might be similar to the Patti
Territorial program in Italy in 1997 in terms of the development of the program plan by
the local authorities or local entities concerned. In contrast, this Japanese program differs
from Law 488 in Italy, which ranks firms’ plans and funds them in the order of their rank-
ing. The Japanese program does not fund using a rank order and local authorities are
required to meet a minimal criterion, even if the ministry announces competition.
The subsidy amounts to a maximum of two million dollars per year.3 This program lasts
for 3 years. The amounts depend on the job creation plan, but the municipalities are
required to pay less than 15,000 dollars for each newly created job. Therefore,
amounts are associated with the population size, due to an expectation that the num-
ber of newly created jobs will be higher in larger municipalities with high unemploy-
ment and many establishments. In addition, designated municipalities can obtain up
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to half a million dollars for business activities that induce local employment growth, such as
the creation of new local brand goods (many municipalities use local specialty agricultural
products to create local brand goods) or the expansion of new business opportunities.
Local authorities use this subsidy for job training to address local unemployment,
seminars about increasing business for local establishments, and activities to help find
jobs and fill vacancies. Local authorities collaborate with job placement offices and
discuss job vacancies with participants in job training. Local authorities also hold joint
job festivals and joint job interviews for local job seekers and establishments. Local
authorities cannot use this program’s subsidies for physical capital investment or
infrastructure investment as in other countries’ place-based programs (e.g., Law 488 in
Italy or the European Regional Development Fund).
The contents of job training and seminars for local establishments differ among mu-
nicipalities, depending on the local industrial structure. However, the guidebook of the
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare suggests that it is efficient if the contents of
job training, seminars for local establishments, and business activities that the treated
municipalities conduct are all related. The business activities are consistent with the
business areas that local establishments expect to expand, and job training is consistent
with the skills that those business activities and expected expansion business areas re-
quire for workers. According to a public announcement, 81.4 and 66.6% of municipal-
ities conducted activities in the agricultural and tourism sectors, respectively, in a
program started in 2008. Many municipalities conduct this program in the agricultural
and tourism sectors.
Regarding planned uses of the subsidy, the budget for salaries for persons who con-
duct the program (the municipalities are required to hire new workers) accounts for 40
to 60% of the total budget of this program, not including the subsidy for the business
activities. The budget for seminars for local establishments accounts for 30 to 40% of
the rest of the budget, the budget for job trainings accounts for 50 to 60%, and the
budget for activities to help find jobs and fill vacancies accounts for approximately
10%. As for the budget for business activities, the budget for salaries for persons who
conduct business activities (the municipalities are required to hire new workers)
accounts for approximately 50%. The municipalities use the rest of the subsidy for raw
material, monitors, trial marketing, and other uses.
In Fig. 1, red indicates municipalities that conducted this program from 2007 to 2009
and the blue is for 2010 to 2013.4 The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare stops
municipal plans if a targeted municipality cannot reach 50% of the expected outcome
or 90% of all expected subset goals. Neumark and Grijalva (2013) argue that allowing
regions to claw back credits when the job creation goals are not met appears to make
these credits more effective, as mentioned earlier. This Japanese place-based job
creation program started in 2007, and the government decided on a new policy for
local regeneration at that time.
3 Incidence of the program and efficient use
3.1 Empirical model
First, this paper examines the incidence of the place-based job creation program ex-
plained in the above section. To evaluate its incidence, this paper uses the difference-
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in-differences method. Neumark and Kolko (2010) carefully discuss how to create a
control group in their estimation of California’s enterprise zone program, and Neumark
and Simpson (2015) report how to identify a control group. They argue that some pre-
vious studies’ broad control groups make no sense (e.g., estimating the effects of enter-
prise zones in several states by comparing them with areas in states outside the
enterprise zones). In addition, they argue that matching census tracts with enterprise
zones that use propensity score matching does not account for the unobservable
sources of job growth differences.
One approach to creating a control group is to designate a narrow buffer immedi-
ately outside the treated areas. Billings (2009) and Neumark and Kolko (2010) use this
approach. However, the place-based job creation program that this paper examines
includes seminars on how to attract people to buy local products from the treated
area, making it possible to push neighboring municipalities’ consumer demand far
from the neighboring municipalities’ markets. Therefore, this paper does not use this
approach. The other approach, as in Busso and Kline (2007)5 and Neumark and Kolko
(2010), is to use areas added later or earlier to enterprise zones or treated areas. Busso
et al. (2013) use rejected and future applicants to the empowerment program as a
control group. Neumark and Simpson (2015) argue that this second approach “can be
more reliable than using close areas as controls because it has been demonstrated
through the policy process that the areas in the control groups that were included in
the zone [treated areas] at some point during the sample period were appropriate for
enterprise zone [policy] designation.” This paper uses rejected and future applicants
to the Japanese place-based program as a control group following Busso et al. (2013).
Fig. 1 Treated municipalities (red) and control municipalities (blue). The treatment municipalities started the
Japanese place-based job creation program in 2007, 2008, or 2009. The control municipalities started the
program in 2010, 2011, 2012, or 2013 and did not conduct the program from 2007 to 2009
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Therefore, the treatment group includes municipalities that started the program in
2007, 2008, or 2009. The control group includes municipalities that started the pro-
gram in 2010, 2011, 2012, or 2013 and did not conduct the program from 2007 to
2009. There is no information about why municipalities in the control group did not
use the program in earlier years. The control group might have rejected or not applied
for this subsidy because members were unwilling to apply for the program or did not
have information about the program. This paper examined whether the level of job va-
cancy per job seeker of the control group is higher than the eligible level to apply for
this subsidy, but most of the municipalities in the control group were eligible to apply
for this program’s subsidy from 2007 to 2009. The empirical model is as follows:
Y it ¼ α0 þ α1dt þ α2TCi þ α3dtTCi þ α4Xit þ εit; ð1Þ
where Yit is a log of outcomes in city i at time t. This paper uses as outcomes (1) the
number of workers who live in the targeted city (treatment/control group) and (2) the
number of workers who work in the targeted city. This paper also estimates the effect
by sector, including (3) the number of workers in the agricultural sector; the wholesale,
retail trade, and service sector; the manufacturing sector; and the financial sector. This
paper predicts that we will observe a significant positive effect in the agricultural sector
and in the wholesale, retail trade, and service sector because many treated municipal-
ities conduct trial businesses, such as the creation of local brand goods using regional
specialty products or the expansion of business opportunities to sell local specialties in
these sectors. These programs also implement job training and seminars for local es-
tablishments in these sectors. The effect on manufacturing is unclear because the
manufacturing sector is weak in many of the treated municipalities. This paper also
predicts that we will not observe significant effects in the financial sector because this
program does not directly intervene to create jobs in the financial sector. Further-
more, this paper analyzes whether this program induces labor mobility. Therefore,
this paper examines the effect on (4) the population, (5) the number of households,
(6) the population inflow, and (7) the population outflow. Unfortunately, there are no
data about wages or housing costs at the municipality level, especially in the small
municipalities where the treatment or control groups are located, while Kline and
Moretti (2014a) argue that housing cost could increase depending on the elasticity of
the housing supply. However, the impact of housing costs is minimal in these areas
due to the current population decrease in Japan. Some houses become unoccupied
because of the decrease in the population. This paper observes sales volume, instead
of wages, in Section 4. dt is the time dummy, which equals 0 before the period from
2007 to 2009 and 1 after 2010. TCi is the treatment group dummy, which equals 1 if
city i is the treatment group and is otherwise zero. α3 is the estimated effect of the
place-based job creation program. Xit are control variables, such as the lag share of
manufacturing among the total number of workers, the change in population density
over the 2000–2005 period and the unemployment rate in the base year (i.e., 2000).
Second, to explore the feature of regions where this program works more efficiently,
this paper estimates Eq. (1) by the sample group divided by (1) the proportion of people
older than 65 years old, which is more than 32% of the total population in 2000 or
otherwise; (2) the working age population, which is less than 58.5% of the total popula-
tion in 2000 or otherwise; and (3) the population per square kilometer, which is more
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than 176.65 and less than 439.825 or otherwise. Thirty-two percent is almost equivalent
to the prediction for the national average aging rate in 2030.6 A municipality with a
large aging population has less consumer demand. A large aging population also indi-
cates a smaller labor supply. This paper examines whether the effect of this program is
less in municipalities with large aging populations. The aim of using the working age
population rather than the labor force participation rate is to roughly capture the
negative effect of having too few young residents (e.g., only one class in each grade at
school, resulting in less competition; fewer peer effects; less information about career
options from friends; and less influence and fewer opportunities for younger genera-
tions to play important roles in the community). This paper also predicts that the
programs will affect municipalities with lower population densities less because munici-
palities with lower population density do not benefit from an agglomeration economy.
An overly high population density also has disadvantages; therefore, this paper divides
the sample by the third quartile of population density (when the population per square
kilometer is more than 176.65 and less than 439.825) or otherwise. The estimations of
model (1) are clustered by municipality.7
3.2 Data
This paper obtains data from population censuses in 2000, 2005, and 2010. Japan’s
population census is conducted almost every 5 years. It covers all Japanese territories
and surveys numerous topics (e.g., work status, place of work, population by age, and
number of households). Treatment (started the program in 2007, 2008, or 2009) and
control (started the projects in 2010, 2011, 2012, or 2013 and did not take part in the
program from 2007 to 2009) municipalities include few municipalities with enormous
populations; thus, this paper excludes municipalities with populations greater than the
90th percentile. After excluding municipalities with populations greater than the 90th
percentile, there are 167 municipalities in the treatment group and 81 municipalities in
the control group. The population distribution in 2000 is shown in Fig. 2. Figure 1,
mentioned earlier, indicates that the red area represents treated municipalities and the
Fig. 2 The distribution of population in 2000. Dash line is median (21,927). Width of bins is 10,000. Data
from Japan’s population census in 2000
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blue area represents control municipalities. Figure 3 indicates the number of programs
launched by year. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the pretreatment sample, and
Table 2 provides p values for the t test of the null hypothesis that average pretreatment
levels and the trends of the treatment group and control group are equal. Although
Table 2 shows that the levels and trends of the treatment group and control group are
similar over the 2000–2005 period, some minor differences arise (e.g., in the manufac-
turing share level, the unemployment level, and trends in population density). This
paper excludes these differences using control variables. For population inflow and out-
flow, this paper uses data from the Basic Resident Registration, for which mayors are
responsible.
Figure 4 shows the changes in outcomes for the treatment group and control group.
The solid line indicates the treatment group, and dotted lines indicate its confidence
intervals. The dash line indicates the control group, and gray dash lines indicate its
confidence intervals. Figure 4a indicates that the normalized logged numbers of
workers who live in the treatment/control group decreases, and the magnitude of the
decrease is the same between the treatment and control groups from 1990 to 2005.
The confidence intervals of treatment and control groups overlap. However, after
starting the program, the treatment group’s decreasing trend is slowed, while the
control group’s trend becomes more rapid. The confidence intervals of the two
groups do not overlap. Figure 4b shows the normalized logged numbers of workers
who work in the treatment/control group. We find the same evidence here. Figure 4c,
d shows trends for the normalized logged population and logged number of house-
holds, respectively. Both groups’ logged populations are stagnant from 2000 to 2005;
however, the control group’s logged population decreases sharply after 2005, while
the treatment group’s logged population decreases slightly. The population census in
2005 recorded a decrease in total population for the first time since the Second
World War. The level of normalized logged number of households of the control
group is higher until 2005, and both groups increase during the years 1995 to 2005,
but the number stagnates in the control group and increases slightly in the treatment
group after 2005.
Figure 4e–h indicates the normalized logged numbers of workers by sector. In the
control group, the agricultural sector and the wholesale, retail trade, and service sector
show more rapid downward trends after 2005, while the levels of the control group are
higher in those sectors until 2005. The manufacturing and financial sectors show
Fig. 3 The number of programs launched each year
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similar trends in the treatment and control groups after starting the program. There are
no data about wages or housing costs at the municipality level in the treatment and con-
trol groups. However, instead of wages, this paper discusses sales volume in Section 4. In
addition, housing costs might not increase dramatically because the population decreases
at the national level, and the treatment and control groups are in rural areas.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of pre-treatment sample (levels in 2005)
Variable Treatment group Control group
Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Workers live ina 9.01 1.10 6.03 11.04 9.40 1.09 5.82 11.44
Workers work inb 8.94 1.12 6.13 11.17 9.33 1.13 5.83 11.46
Population 9.74 1.13 6.56 11.80 10.11 1.10 6.08 12.05
Households 8.69 1.16 5.51 10.90 9.05 1.09 5.22 10.97
Population inflow 6.27 1.26 3.00 8.88 6.57 1.20 2.40 8.60
Population outflow 6.50 1.17 3.37 8.84 6.77 1.13 2.71 8.73
Workers in
Agriculture 6.82 1.20 0.00 9.13 7.25 1.09 3.22 8.88
Wholesale, retail trade, and service 8.23 1.20 5.23 10.41 8.61 1.16 4.73 10.57
Manufacturing 6.83 1.34 2.20 9.23 7.38 1.65 0.00 10.43
Financial 4.67 1.41 1.10 7.23 5.14 1.30 1.39 7.40
Observations 167 81
Means, standard deviations, maximum values, and minimum values using population census in 2005. All variables are
logarithms. Observations of workers in a financial sector are 165 in the treatment group and 79 in the control group
aWorkers who live in the treatment/control municipalities
bWorkers who work in the treatment/control municipalities
Table 2 Descriptive statistics—differences between groups
Variable Treatment group Control group p value of
difference
aMean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Level in 2005
Manufacturing shareb 13.16 6.20 15.92 7.80 0.003
Government service sharec 4.57 2.22 4.49 2.43 0.777
Unemployment rate 6.09 2.40 5.43 1.90 0.032
Aging population share 28.76 6.54 27.96 5.26 0.336
Working age population share 57.89 4.77 58.71 3.91 0.181
Population densityd 314.81 613.89 223.02 396.94 0.221
Trend over the 2000–2005 period
Manufacturing shareb −9.89 20.53 −11.92 12.32 0.412
Government service sharec 1.54 12.20 1.53 9.07 0.995
Unemployment rate 53.41 37.37 49.27 35.65 0.407
Aging population share 12.86 4.66 13.32 4.99 0.479
Working age population share −2.91 2.26 −2.85 1.64 0.845
Population densityd −17.41 26.20 −27.73 33.34 0.008
Observations 167 81
Means, standard deviations, and p values using population census in 2000 and 2005
ap value of difference presents p values for the t test of the null hypothesis that average pretreatment levels and the
trends of the treatment group and control group are equal
bManufacturing share is a share of manufacturing among the total number of workers
cGovernment service share is a share of government services among the total number of workers
dPopulation density is population per square kilometers
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Fig. 4 (See legend on next page.)
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3.3 Results
Table 3 shows that the coefficients of the cross-term between the time dummy and
treatment group dummy are significantly positive in the first and second rows.8 The
place-based job creation program increases the number of local jobs by approximately
5%. The effect on workers who work in the treated municipalities is slightly greater
than the effect on workers who live in the treated municipalities, indicating that this
program is intensely local. The gains from local establishments creating jobs or match-
ing local establishments with unemployment through this program are slightly greater
than the gains of residents who undertake job training through this program.
The third row and below show the estimation results by sector. As mentioned in
Section 2, most municipalities use this program in the agricultural and tourism
sectors. As predicted, the estimation results indicate that the place-based job creation
program increases the number of workers in the agricultural sector by approximately
11%. The program affects the agricultural sector most positively. The program
increases the number of workers in the wholesale, retail trade, and service sector by
approximately 5%, as shown in column (1) and column (2), respectively, which are
smaller (but positive) effects than those in the agricultural sector. If the model con-
trols for the unemployment rate in the base year, the effect is insignificant, but it is
(See figure on previous page.)
Fig. 4 a Workers who live in the treatment/control group. b Workers who work in the treatment/control
group. c Population. d Households. Workers in e Agriculture. f Wholesale, retail trade, and service. g
Manufacturing. h Financial. Depicts means of logged numbers of the listed variables in treatment and
control municipalities. The means are normalized by the values in 2005. The solid line indicates the
treatment group, and dotted lines indicate its confidence intervals. The dash line indicates the control group,
and gray dash lines indicate its confidence intervals
Table 3 Incidence of the programs
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Robust Robust Robust
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Workers live ina 0.062** 0.031 0.055* 0.030 0.045 0.027
Workers work inb 0.062** 0.029 0.056** 0.028 0.046* 0.025
Workers in
Agriculture 0.119** 0.055 0.113** 0.053 0.112** 0.052
Wholesale, retail trade, and service 0.055* 0.029 0.050* 0.028 0.038 0.026
Manufacturing 0.061 0.047 0.042 0.046 0.032 0.045
Financial 0.002 0.035 0.005 0.040 0.007 0.042
Control variables
Manufacturing share (lag) No Yes Yes
Trend in population density No Yes Yes
Unemployment ratec No No Yes
Observations 742 742 742
Observations of workers in a financial sector is 733. Each entry gives the difference-in-differences estimate of the pro-
gram on the outcome presented in each row. Dependent variables are logged numbers of workers. Standard errors are
clustered by municipality. Data from Japan’s population census in 2000, 2005, and 2010
** and *indicate significance at the 5 and 10% level, respectively
aWorkers who live in the treatment/control municipalities
bWorkers who work in the treatment/control municipalities
cIn the base year
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significant in municipalities with a lower aging rate or larger working age population
size, as shown later. Employment in the agricultural sector increases through the ris-
ing sale of agricultural specialties via this program’s promotion or via rising demand
for a supply of new local brands. Sometimes, female farmers start to work for a new
local brand. Employment in the wholesale, retail trade, and service sectors increases
through job training in concierge services or information technology skills. By
contrast, the program does not affect the manufacturing and financial sectors as
predicted. The coefficients are insignificant from column (1) to column (3).
Additionally, these results indicate that the program does not induce a transfer from
the manufacturing or financial sectors to the agricultural or wholesale, retail trade,
and service sectors.
This paper roughly calculates cost using the results above. It multiplies the average
number of workers in the agricultural sector in 2005 by 11% and multiplies the average
number of workers in the wholesale, retail trade, and service sector in 2005 by 5%,
followed by aggregation of these two numbers. This aggregate is the number of workers
increased by the place-based job creation programs. Dividing 2.5 million dollars by this
increased number of workers equals approximately 4857 dollars. This amount might be
an overestimation of the programs because municipalities simultaneously use municipal
budgets to promote local job creation, and many municipalities also use subsidies
provided by other ministries. In fact, when they apply this program, municipalities are
recommended to design their programs in relation to their industry promotion policies
and related policies for local regeneration by other ministries. Therefore, they can use
their budgets for their industry promotion policy, and they can, in most cases, obtain
subsidies from other ministries for related local regeneration policies.9 Note, however,
that the municipalities in the control group also generally use their municipal budgets
to promote local job creation, and they obtain subsidies provided by other ministries.
Table 4 shows estimation results regarding mobility. This paper examines whether
migration occurs because of increasing jobs in the treatment group. In column (1) and
column (2), the results indicate that the program increases the population and number
of households in the treatment group. Furthermore, regarding whether these increases
Table 4 Incidence of the programs about population, the number of household, and the mobility
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Coef. Robust std. err. Coef. Robust std. err. Coef. Robust std. err.
Population 0.062* 0.034 0.056* 0.032 0.045 0.029
Households 0.065** 0.031 0.060** 0.029 0.049* 0.026
Population inflow 0.064** 0.030 0.062** 0.028 0.048** 0.024
Population outflow 0.051 0.035 0.049 0.033 0.036 0.028
Control variables
Manufacturing share (lag) No Yes Yes
Trend in population density No Yes Yes
Unemployment ratea No No Yes
Observations 742 742 742
Each entry gives the difference-in-differences estimate of the program on the outcome presented in each row.
Dependent variables are logged population or numbers of households. Standard errors are clustered by municipality.
Data from Japan’s population census in 2000, 2005, and 2010
** and *indicate significance at the 5 and 10% level, respectively
aIn the base year
Kazekami IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2017) 6:1 Page 12 of 27
are the results of migration, the results for population inflow in the third row are sig-
nificant, while the results for population outflow in the fourth row are insignificant.
The place-based job creation program induces population inflow and, moreover, net
inflow.
Next, this paper considers which municipalities the program affects most. Table 5
shows that the program has more effects in the municipalities with small aging popu-
lations or large working age populations. The upper part of Table 5 indicates that
municipalities with an elderly population (older than 65 years old) of less than 32%
generate more jobs for workers who live in the municipalities in the treatment group;
workers who work in the municipalities in the treatment group; workers in the agri-
culture sector; and workers in the wholesale, retail trade, and service sector. More-
over, the coefficients of the cross-term between the time dummy and treatment
group dummy in municipalities with large elderly populations are insignificant. Re-
markably, the magnitude of coefficients is larger for workers in agricultural sectors in
municipalities with smaller elderly populations than in all municipalities.
The middle part of Table 5 displays results for municipalities divided by the share
of working-age population, instead of the aging population. The magnitudes of the
programs’ effects are significantly larger in municipalities with large working age pop-
ulations than in that of the whole sample. If there are fewer residents of working age,
the programs’ effect is insignificant. Even if commuting workers are included, the re-
sult is insignificant. Thus, the insignificant result does not come from a shortage of
labor supply. These results indicate that a small working age population has negative
impacts, such as a lack of energy among locals. The lower part of Table 5 indicates
the results from dividing municipalities by population density. This paper predicts
that the program affects municipalities with lower population densities less than those
with higher population densities. The results are almost the same as predicted.10
4 Externality of the program
4.1 Empirical model and data
Although the program is efficient, is it a zero-sum game? In this section, this paper
considers whether the increase in consumer demand and the employment growth in
the treated municipalities do not take consumer demand away from neighboring muni-
cipalities. This paper analyzes whether the logged number of workers who live in neigh-
boring municipalities and the logged number of workers who work in neighboring
municipalities decrease through place-based job creation programs using the
difference-in-difference method. This paper conducts the same analysis for sales, the
number of employed workers, and the number of establishments associated with gen-
eral retail and food and beverage retail because the municipalities primarily use this
program in the tourism and agricultural sectors. If tourism were to increase in the
treatment group, the sale of souvenirs, food, sweets, and drinks could increase. In turn,
if local brand goods that use local specialty agricultural products sold well, the sale of
souvenirs, food, and sweets could increase. The term “neighbor” is used if more than
10% of workers who live in city c commute to any targeted municipalities in 2005. Neu-
mark and Kolko (2010) and Givord et al. (2013) use a ring around a targeted area as a
neighboring area. However, mountains and rivers are often obstacles to traffic, and
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public transportation is more common than driving in Japan. Thus, commuting zones
are not concentric circles in Japan. This paper uses the following model:
Y it ¼ δ0 þ δ1dt þ δ2TCi þ δ3Ntrei þ δ4Nconi þ δ5dtTCi þ δ6dtNtrei
þ δ7dtNconi þ δ8Xit þ εit ; ð2Þ
where Yit is the logged number of workers who live in the targeted municipalities and
the logged number of workers who work in the targeted municipalities, the log of sales,
employed workers, and establishments in the general retail trade sector and in the food
and beverage retail trade sector in city i at time t. Ntrei equals 1 if city i is a neighbor-
ing municipality of the treatment group, and Nconi equals 1 if city i is a neighboring
municipality of the control group. Therefore, the control group is the baseline. This
paper confirms the positive effects on the treatment municipalities and predicts a nega-
tive effect on neighboring municipalities of the treatment group compared with the
control municipalities if the program takes the consumption of neighboring municipal-
ities away. Moreover, the coefficient of neighboring municipalities of the control group
is insignificant in theory.
Data are obtained from the census of commerce in 2002, 2007, and 2012.11 The
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry conducts this survey, which covers all
wholesale and retail trade stores. This paper also obtains data about the number of
workers who live in the targeted municipalities and the number of workers who work
in the targeted municipalities from the population census, as mentioned in Section 3.2.
This paper estimates Eq. (2) using a block bootstrap method. The prefecture level is
used as a block.
4.2 Estimation results
The first row in Table 6 indicates that the cross-terms between a treatment group
dummy and a time dummy are significantly positive. The programs increase the num-
ber of workers who live in the treatment group, the number of workers who work in
the treatment group, and the general retail sales in the treatment group, compared the
control group. However, there is no difference between neighboring municipalities of
the treatment and control groups, neighboring municipalities of the control group and
the control group in terms of the number of workers, sales, and establishments, as
shown in the second and third rows by each outcome. This paper does not clearly ob-
serve the program’s destruction of neighboring municipalities’ demand.
5 Robustness check
Finally, as a robustness check, this paper uses data collected before starting the pro-
gram to estimate model (1) in Section 3.1. This paper uses the population censuses of
1995, 2000, and 2005. The time dummy, dt, equals 1 if the data are from 2005 and is
otherwise 0. This paper confirms that the outcomes of the treatment group do not dif-
fer from those of the control group after 2005 (i.e., the placebo event year). Table 7
shows the estimation results. All the results indicate an insignificant effect. The placebo
event does not differently affect the workers who live in or work in the targeted muni-
cipalities or workers in the agricultural sector and the wholesale, retail, and service sec-
tor, nor does it affect the manufacturing and financial sectors in the treatment group
compared with workers in the control group. By the same token, the placebo event
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Table 6 The effect on the neighboring municipalities
(1) (2)
Observed Bootstrap Observed Bootstrap
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
All sectors
Workers live in
Dtc 0.053*** 0.018 0.054** 0.024
Dntre 0.016 0.033 0.030 0.039
Dncon −0.014 0.017 −0.015 0.025
Workers work in
Dtc 0.053*** 0.018 0.055*** 0.021
Dntre 0.020 0.035 0.033 0.040
Dncon −0.002 0.018 −0.003 0.025
General retail trade sector
Sales
Dtc 0.122* 0.072 0.118 0.073
Dntre 0.053 0.177 0.043 0.139
Dncon −0.038 0.109 −0.024 0.112
Workers
Dtc 0.034 0.025 0.030 0.029
Dntre −0.014 0.018 −0.013 0.037
Dncon −0.029 0.049 −0.025 0.058
Establishments
Dtc 0.041* 0.023 0.038 0.026
Dntre −0.007 0.017 −0.007 0.029
Dncon −0.035 0.041 −0.033 0.050
Food and beverage retail trade sector
Sales
Dtc −0.038 0.067 −0.032 0.053
Dntre −0.059 0.074 −0.050 0.073
Dncon −0.215* 0.123 −0.204* 0.119
Workers
Dtc 0.000 0.034 −0.003 0.035
Dntre −0.024 0.060 −0.024 0.061
Dncon −0.023 0.068 −0.020 0.068
Establishments
Dtc 0.020 0.025 0.016 0.027
Dntre −0.007 0.025 −0.006 0.031
Dncon −0.035 0.037 −0.033 0.042
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does not affect the population or the number of households in the treatment group, as
shown in the lower part of Table 7.
6 Conclusion
This paper has three purposes. First, empirical evaluations of job creation have rarely
been conducted in Japan. The results show that the program increases the number of
workers, especially workers commuting to the municipalities conducting the programs,
and the program induces a net population inflow. Furthermore, the programs remark-
ably affect the agricultural sector and the wholesale, retail trade, and service sector, in
which most municipalities conduct trial businesses or seminars via these programs.
Table 7 Placebo test
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Robust Robust Robust
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Workers live ina −0.004 0.032 0.010 0.032 0.018 0.033
Workers work inb 0.001 0.031 0.013 0.031 0.021 0.032
Workers in
Agriculture 0.018 0.044 0.029 0.043 0.029 0.043
Wholesale, retail trade, and service −0.006 0.029 0.005 0.030 0.014 0.031
Manufacturing −0.016 0.043 0.033 0.040 0.041 0.042
Financial −0.026 0.073 −0.008 0.072 0.011 0.067
Population 0.002 0.030 0.014 0.030 0.023 0.031
Households 0.006 0.030 0.013 0.030 0.022 0.031
Control variables
Manufacturing share (lag) No Yes Yes
Trend in population density No Yes Yes
Unemployment ratec No No Yes
Observations 741 741 741
Observations of workers in a financial sector is 735. Each entry gives the difference-in-differences estimate of the program on
the outcome presented in each row. Dependent variables are logged numbers of workers, population, or households.
Standard errors are clustered by municipality. Data from population census in 1995, 2000, and 2005. This paper assumes that
the placebo event occurs in 2005 and confirms that the outcomes of the treatment group do not differ from those of
the control group after 2005
***, **, and *indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively
aWorkers who live in the treatment/control municipalities
bWorkers who work in the treatment/control municipalities
cIn the base year
Table 6 The effect on the neighboring municipalities (Continued)
Control variables
Manufacturing share (lag) No Yes
Trend in population density No Yes
Observationsa 974 974
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively
Each entry gives the difference-in-differences estimate of the program on the outcome presented in each row. dTC time
dummy × treatment dummy, dNtre time dummy × neighbor of treatment group dummy, dNcon time dummy × neighbor
of control group dummy. Dependent variables are logged numbers of workers, sales, or numbers of establishments. Data
from the population census in 2000, 2005, and 2010 for all sectors and from the census of commerce in 2002, 2007, and
2012 (to be more precise, the economic census in 2012. It covers the census of commerce) for a general retail trade
sector and food and beverage retail trade sector. Estimations use a block bootstrap. A prefecture level is used as a block
aObservations for sales in a general retail trade sector are 838, observations for sales in a food and beverage retail trade
sector are 895, observations for workers and establishments in both sectors are 900 for columns (1) and (2), respectively
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Intuitively, the joining together of the local firms, municipal government, members
conducting this program, job placement offices, and job seekers, all owing to the launch
of this program, is a key factor in increasing employment.
Second, this paper demonstrates that the program has lesser effects in municipalities
with large aging populations or small working age populations. These results might
indicate that the sole improvement in job creation in the disadvantaged areas is not
sufficient. The firms prefer a thick labor market; thus, an agglomeration of people is
needed. A small working age population has negative impacts on young people and
local economic activity. A policy of reversing the decrease in young people or improving
local activity might be needed with a place-based job creation program.
Third, this paper confirms whether a zero-sum game occurs. Government officials
only calculate the number of workers generated in the treated municipalities, but con-
sidering the total effect is important for policy evaluation. Many municipalities conduct
seminars on how to attract people to purchase local specialty products. However, this
paper does not observe a clear decrease in sales or in the number of workers in neigh-
boring municipalities of the treatment group.
One limitation of this study is that the magnitude of the positive incidence of this place-
based job creation program includes some impacts of other subsidies because the treat-
ment municipalities are recommended to design the program in relation to their industry
promotion policies and related policies for local regeneration by other ministries, although
the municipalities in the control group also use these subsidies. To expand this paper, it
must be determined whether the program reduces unemployment benefits in the treated
municipalities. However, this program also induces the participation of the potentially un-
employed, such as female workers (sometimes from farming families).
Endnotes
1Chiiki koyo suishin jigyo in Japanese
2Therefore, they could use their budgets for their industry promotion policy, and they
could, in most cases, obtain subsidies from other ministries for related local regener-
ation policies. This paper cannot obtain the exact information. However, for example,
city A conducts this program from the last half year in 2014 to 2016 (this paper does
not cover the program from 2014). The amount of subsidy for city A was approxi-
mately 300,000 dollars for half a year in 2014 and 830,000 dollars in 2015. In 2014, city
A had a budget for local industry promotion policies totaling 50,000 dollars. This
budget was used for the subsidy for the cost of renovation or rent of persons who open
new shops using a local vacant building and tax exemption for firms who open new es-
tablishments or increase the number of establishments.
3If neighboring municipalities apply jointly, this subsidy can be up to three million
dollars per year.
4This paper explains that this paper excludes the few municipalities with enormous
populations (greater than the 90th percentile) in Section 3.2. Figure 1 excludes those
municipalities (not painted red or blue).
5This refers to an unpublished paper, entitled, “Do Local Economic Development
Programs Work? Evidence from the Federal Empowerment Zone Program,” which was
referenced by Neumark and Kolko (2010). The definition of the control group appears
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to be the same as that used in the methods reported by Busso, Gregory, and Kline
(2013).
6According to predictions by the National Institute of Population and Social Secur-
ity Research in January 2012, the aging rates in 2030 will be 31.6, 30.9, and 32.3% by
neutral birth rate, high birth rate, and low birth rate, respectively (the mortality rate
is neutral for every case).
7If municipalities jointly conduct this program, the municipalities are identified in the
same cluster.
8As shown in Table 2, the unemployment rate of a treatment group in 2005 (before start-
ing programs) was slightly higher than that of the control group, and the trends in un-
employment rates were almost the same in both groups. The job creation program affects
the unemployment rate. Therefore, this paper controls for unemployment rate in the base
year.
9See note 2.
10Sample sizes of municipalities with less elderly people, large working age population,
and high population density are larger than those of municipalities with more elderly
people, a small working age population, and lower population density. Therefore, this
paper calculates the effect size that is not influenced by the sample size. As a result, the
program surely affects municipalities with fewer elderly people. Additionally, this paper
runs another estimation for robustness. This paper adds a cross-term of the time dummy,
treatment dummy, and features of regions (i.e., elderly, smaller working age population,
or less population density dummy) in Eq. (1) and estimates the entire sample. As a result,
the elderly dummy and the lower working age population dummy are significantly nega-
tive for workers although this estimation is constrained by some coefficients being equal.
11To be more precise, data in 2012 from the economic census in 2012. The economic
census covers the census of commerce.
Table 8 The estimation result using alternative methods
Dependent variable (1) (2)
Robust Robust
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Workers live ina 0.148* 0.076 0.044 0.028
Workers work inb 0.156* 0.081 0.045* 0.026
Workers in
Agriculture 0.240** 0.095 0.111** 0.052
Wholesale, retail trade, and service 0.136* 0.080 0.037 0.026
Manufacturing 0.158 0.096 0.030 0.046
Financial 0.138 0.109 0.008 0.043
Population 0.144* 0.076 0.044 0.030
Households 0.135* 0.075 0.048* 0.026
Observations 678 742
Dependent variables are the change in logged number of workers/people/households. Column (1): this paper estimates
the model using the selected control municipalities that are close enough to the treatment municipalities. Column (2):
this paper applies the inverse of probability weight. The estimation models for the column (1) and (2) includes all control
variables (the lag share of manufacturing, the trend in population density and the unemployment rate in the base year)
** and * indicate significance at the 5 and 10% level, respectively
aWorkers who live in the treatment/control municipalities
bWorkers who work in the treatment/control municipalities
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Appendix 1
This paper estimates the Japanese place-based program using alternative methods for
double robustness. First, this paper selects the control municipalities using propensity
matching score to use only control municipalities that are close enough to the treat-
ment municipalities. Then, this paper estimates Eq. (1) using difference in difference
method. The results shown in column (1) in Table 8 indicate that the effects of the pro-
gram on the treatment municipalities compared with the selected control group are
greater than the effects when this study uses all the control municipalities. Additionally,
the coefficients of the effects on the workers in the wholesale, retail trade, and service
sector, and the population are significant even if this paper uses all control variables al-
though they are insignificant in Tables 3 and 4.
Second, this paper estimates Eq. (1) applying the inverse of probability weight
because the number of control group is smaller than that of treatment group. The re-
sults shown in column (2) in Table 8 indicate the similar results to Tables 3 and 4. The
coefficients are very slightly smaller than the coefficients in Tables 3 and 4. Even if this
paper apply the inverse of probability weight, this paper finds that the Japanese place-
based job creation program increases the number of workers who work in the treated
municipalities, workers in the agricultural sector, and the number of households.
Appendix 2
To analyze the zero-sum game, this paper also estimates model (2) in Section 4.1:
(1) municipalities in the treatment group versus neighboring municipalities of the
treatment group (Nconi and TCi equal 0 in this case); (2) municipalities in the
control group versus neighboring municipalities of the control group (Ntrei and
TCi equal 0 in this case); and (3) neighboring municipalities of the treatment
group versus neighboring municipalities of the control group (Nconi and TCi
equal 0 and the baseline consists of neighboring municipalities of control munici-
palities in this case). Regarding (1), if the program has a positive effect on the
treatment group, it is possible that we observe a negative effect on neighboring
municipalities of the treatment group, although the outcomes of the neighboring
municipalities do not change. Regarding (2), this paper confirms no effect on the
neighboring municipalities of the control group. Then, regarding (3), this paper
predicts a negative effect on neighboring municipalities of the treatment group,
compared to the neighboring municipalities of the control group, if the increase
in consumer demand and the employment growth in the treatment group take
consumer demand away from neighboring municipalities.
As a result, column (1) and column (2) in Table 9 show that the number of
resident workers and commuting workers in neighboring municipalities of the
treatment group does not decrease due to place-based job creation programs.
The program decreases the number of workers and establishments in the general
retail trade sector in neighboring municipalities of the treatment group. However,
as mentioned earlier, if the program has a positive effect on the treatment group,
we observe negative effects on neighboring municipalities of the treatment group
compared with the treatment group, although the outcomes of the neighboring
municipalities do not change. Table 10 shows the results for this program’s ef-
fects using the census of commerce to establish difference-in-differences between
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the treatment group and the control group. The program increases the sales and
number of establishments associated with general retail trade in the treatment
group.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 9 shows neighboring municipalities of the control
group versus municipalities in the control group. As expected, the programs do not
Fig. 5 Effects on neighboring municipalities by definitions of neighboring municipalities. Figure indicates
the coefficients of the cross-term between the time dummy and the neighboring municipalities of the
treatment group’ dummy by definitions of neighboring municipalities. Outcomes are log of sales in general
retail trade when this paper compares neighboring municipalities of the treatment group versus neighboring
municipalities of the control group. 10, 12.5, and 15% indicate that the term of “neighbor” is used if more than
10, 12.5, and 15% of workers who live in a city c commute to any targeted municipalities in 2005. Data from
the census of commerce in 2002, 2007, and 2012 (to be more precise, the economic census in 2012. It covers
the census of commerce)
Table 10 Incidence of the program using census of commerce
(1) (2)
Observed Bootstrap Observed Bootstrap
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
General retail trade
Sales 0.122* 0.073 0.116* 0.064
Workers 0.035 0.024 0.030 0.023
Establishments 0.042* 0.024 0.038* 0.022
Food and beverage retail trade
Sales −0.034 0.065 −0.030 0.075
Workers 0.004 0.033 −0.001 0.033
Establishments 0.022 0.023 0.018 0.027
Control variables
Manufacturing share (lag) No Yes
Trend in population density No Yes
Observations a 736 736
Each entry gives the difference-in-differences estimate of the program on the outcome presented in each row. The
effects of the Japanese place-based program on the treated municipalities compared with the control municipalities.
Dependent variables are logged sales, numbers of workers, or numbers of establishments. Standard errors are clustered by
municipality. Data from the census of commerce in 2002, 2007, and 2012 (to be more precise, the economic census in 2012.
It covers the census of commerce) for a general retail trade sector and food and beverage retail trade sector
* indicates significance at the 10% level
aObservations for sales in a general retail trade sector are 688 for columns (1) and (2). Observations for sales in a food
and beverage retail trade sector are 731 for columns (1) and (2)
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decrease the resident workers, commuting workers, sales, workers, or establishments
in general retail trade and food and beverage retail trade in the neighboring munici-
palities of the control group. Although the program has a significantly negative effect
on resident workers and sales in the food and beverage retail trade sector in neighbor-
ing municipalities of the control group, this effect is insignificant if we control for the
industrial structure and the trend in population density. Instead of comparing neigh-
boring municipalities with the treatment group, this paper compares the neighboring
municipalities of the treatment group with the neighboring municipalities of the con-
trol group because there is a possibility of bias in columns (1) and (2). The effects of
the programs on neighboring municipalities of the treatment group and neighboring
municipalities of the control group do not differ, as shown in column (5) and column
(6). Figure 5 indicates the coefficients of the cross-terms between the time dummy
and the neighboring municipalities’ dummy by the definitions of the neighboring mu-
nicipalities. The term “neighbor” is additionally used if more than 15 and 12.5% of
workers who live in city c commute to any of the targeted municipalities in 2005. The
magnitudes of coefficients decrease with the expansion of the ranges of neighboring
municipalities, although the coefficients are insignificant.











0 .5 1 1.5
Job vacancies per job seeker
Fig. 6 The fraction of municipalities that conducted the place-based job creation program. Blue and red
points are sample average within bin. Lines passing through blue points are the confidence interval. Red verti-
cal dash line is the job vacancies per job seeker threshold to apply the program
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Appendix 3 Online appendix
This paper examines the effects of this job creation program using a regression discon-
tinuity design for robustness. Instead of using the control group described in Section
3.1, this paper compares the treated municipalities with municipalities that have job va-
cancies per job seeker that are only slightly above the national average. As shown in
Section 2, only municipalities that have less than the national average level of job va-
cancies per job seeker can use this job creation program’s subsidy. Municipalities that
have slightly more than the national average level of job vacancies per job seeker are
similar municipalities to the treated municipalities and are randomly assigned.
Figure 6 shows the fraction of municipalities that conducted this place-based job
creation program around the job vacancies per job seeker threshold. Regional data at
the municipal level of job vacancies per job seeker are provided by the Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare. The data are collected by each job placement agency
that administers multiple municipalities. The fraction of municipalities that partici-
pate in this program decreases at a cutoff ratio of 0.9 job vacancies per job seeker in
2008; 0.9 is the ratio required to be eligible for this program’s subsidies. The programs
started in multiple years (2007 to 2009), but this paper uses data from a single year,
2008, for a single threshold. Additionally, common data on job vacancies per job
seeker are used in the multiple municipalities administered by the same job place-
ment agency. These factors demonstrate why this paper does not use a regression dis-
continuity design for the main analysis.
This paper confirms the continuity assumption using the McCrary test before
using regression discontinuity design. Figure 7 indicates that the density function
Regression function fit
Fig. 8 Regression discontinuity design. The change in log number of employment from 2005 to 2010 in
municipalities at the job vacancies per job seeker eligibility threshold. Sample includes 1602 municipalities.
Bin size = 0.123




The null hypothesis of McCrary test is continuity. Data from regional data at the municipal level of job vacancies per job
seeker provided by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively
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of the job vacancies per job seeker is smooth. Table 11 also shows that a t test
fails to reject the null hypothesis of continuity. As for results, Figure 8 shows that
municipalities below the cutoff point increase in employment from 2005 to 2010,
compared to municipalities immediately above the cutoff point. Table 12 displays
estimation results by a regression discontinuity design. I selected the optimal
bandwidth using the Calonico et al. (2016) framework. The change in log number
of employment from 2005 to 2010 in municipalities that are above the threshold is
approximately 8% smaller than the change in municipalities that are below the
threshold (i.e., municipalities that are eligible for this program). The magnitude is
slightly larger than the main results in Table 3. Therefore, although this paper com-
pares the treatment of municipalities with similar municipalities regarding job vacancies
per job seeker, this place-based job creation program increases employment in the treated
municipalities.
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